Brexit’s Effect on Citizens, Human Rights & Immigration by Benson, M. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Benson, M., Bica, M. C., Desira, C., Erdunast, P., Masri, N., Persey, O., 
Sumption, M., Wilkins, H., Yong, A. ORCID: 0000-0002-3939-6781, York, S., Zagrodniczek, 
K. and Zarkovic, M. (2019). Brexit’s Effect on Citizens, Human Rights & Immigration (City 
Law School (CLS) Research Paper No. 2019/03). London, Uk: City Law School Working 
Paper Series. 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22848/
Link to published version: City Law School (CLS) Research Paper No. 2019/03
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
www.city.ac.uk/law 
Academic excellence for business and the 
professions 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City Law School Research Paper 2019/03 
 
 
 
 
Brexit’s Effect on Citizens,  
Human Rights & Immigration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Report of a roundtable held at City, University of London 
on 11 June 2019 
 
(compiled by Maja Zarkovic) 
 
  
2019/03 
2 www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
Michaela Benson, Mihai Calin Bica, Christopher Desira, Paul Erdunast, Nicole Masri, Ollie Persey, 
Madeleine Sumption, Hannah Wilkins, Adrienne Yong, Sheona York, Katarzyna Zagrodniczek, Maja 
Zarkovic 
 
The City Law School 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s). If cited or 
quoted, reference should be made to the name(s) of the author(s), the title, the number, and the 
working paper series 
 
 
All rights reserved. 
 
© 2019 
 
The City Law School Working Paper Series are published by The City Law School, City University 
London, Northampton Square, London, EC1V 0HB. 
 
 
An index to the working papers in The City Law School Working Paper Series is located at: 
www.city.ac.uk/law/research/working-papers 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2019/03 
3 www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... 4 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 5 
A. NEW GOVERNANCE OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UK IN THE CONTEXT OF 
BREXIT ................................................................................................................................... 6 
1) The Immigration Bill, settled status, and an end to free movement ............................. 6 
2) The automated residency checks in the EU Settlement Scheme .............................. 10 
3) EU Settlement Scheme: practical and emotional challenges ..................................... 13 
B. EXPERIENCING IMMIGRATION IN THE UK – VIEWS FROM THE GROUND ........... 17 
1) The impact of the EU Settlement Scheme on women: policy and practice ................ 17 
2) Administrative justice and the EU Settlement Scheme .............................................. 24 
3) Brexit and vulnerable EU citizens .............................................................................. 26 
4) Roma and Brexit Campaigning and Policy Project .................................................... 29 
C. THE BREXIT EFFECT ON CITIZENS’ RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS IN THE EU AND 
THE UK ................................................................................................................................. 32 
1) Retaining rights to protection from expulsion as a fundamental right in Brexit Britain 32 
2) Brexit and the British in the EU-27 beyond the illusion of free movement ................. 36 
3) Unsettled Status? Who is at risk in the Settlement Scheme? .................................... 39 
4) Privatisation, ‘mission creep’ and lack of Home Office legal conscientiousness in the 
Home Office application process ....................................................................................... 41 
Concluding remarks .............................................................................................................. 47 
 
  
2019/03 
4 www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This report records the roundtable on “Brexit’s Effect on Citizens, Human Rights and 
Immigration” organised by Dr Adrienne Yong on 11 June 2019 at City, University of London 
funded by the Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF) 2018/19.  
 
Speakers included:  
• Hannah Wilkins (House of Commons Library) 
• Blanca Grey (Home Office)1 
• Paul Erdunast (Immigration Law Practitioner’s Association - ILPA) 
• Christopher Desira (Seraphus Solicitors) 
• Nicole Masri (Rights of Women) 
• Ollie Persey (Public Law Project) 
• Katarzyna Zagrodniczek (East European Resource Centre) 
• Mihai Calin Bica (Roma Support Group) 
• Dr Adrienne Yong (City, University of London) 
• Dr Michaela Benson (Goldsmiths, University of London) 
• Madeleine Sumption (Migration Observatory)  
• Sheona York (Kent Law Clinic) 
 
A host of unique legal questions were raised in the aftermath of the UK’s referendum result 
where the electorate voted in favour of leaving the EU on the 23 June 2016. Opinion has been 
split as to whether the UK and EU have indeed struck a fair deal for citizens, with arguments 
that citizens have been used as bargaining chips throughout the process to achieve a deal. 
As negotiations progressed towards the original mandated date of withdrawal, 29 March 2019, 
various schemes emerged to handle post-Brexit immigration of EU citizens in the UK and 
reciprocal arrangements for British citizens in the EU. This is now reflected in the EU 
Settlement Scheme, the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination Bill, and the reciprocity 
agreed with EU Member States as to British citizens in the EU. These issues and more were 
discussed at the roundtable. 
 
Keywords: Brexit, human rights, settled status, EU Settlement Scheme, immigration.  
 
  
                                                
1 The Home Office was the only participant that declined the invitation to be included in this report. 
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Introduction 
 
On 30 March 2019, the EU Settlement Scheme was opened by the Home Office to all in-
country applications. The Government announced that all EEA and Swiss citizens, and their 
family members, resident in the UK, will need to apply to secure their rights through an online 
system which would give them status in UK law which will remain valid after Brexit. 
 
This roundtable analysed the state-of-play of immigration in Brexit Britain as it faces the 
challenges of governing almost 4 million individuals who have previously not needed 
governing. It gathered views from policy and legal practice to explain the state of immigration 
in the UK post-referendum on 11 June 2019. It also presented views from the ground of 
experiences of applicants to the EU Settlement Scheme through organisations representing 
citizens applying for settled status and then evaluated the academic viewpoint of the Brexit 
effect on citizens’ rights. 
 
By bringing such a network together, the intention was to inform the debate on citizens’ rights, 
and exchange different forms of knowledge during a crucial time of change for all those 
affected. This report is split into three sections mirroring the programme of the day: 
• Part A will consider the new governance of immigration to the UK in the context of 
Brexit; 
• Part B will consider how immigration is experienced by civil society and NGOs;  
• Part C will present the effect on citizens’ rights across borders in the EU and the UK.  
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A. NEW GOVERNANCE OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UK IN THE CONTEXT OF 
BREXIT 
 
1) The Immigration Bill, settled status, and an end to free movement 
Hannah Wilkins, Senior Library Clerk, Home Affairs, House of Commons Library 
 
Introduction 
The Commons Library provides impartial and independent research so the focus of Wilkins’ 
briefing was to outline the law and policy framework for the EU Settlement Scheme. This 
information intended to lay the groundwork for further discussions on the Scheme itself during 
the roundtable. Wilkins set out the legislative framework as it currently exists and how it will 
change, or needs to change, to end free movement and implement the Scheme. To 
accomplish this, she presented a basic overview of how the UK implements EU free movement 
law, what the Immigration and Social Security EU Coordination Bill planned to do,2 what 
Parliament proposes to do to end free movement in the UK, and what this means for the settled 
status scheme.  
 
The immigration framework for free movement in the UK 
It is helpful to provide context when considering how the Immigration Bill would work.3 The 
majority of EU free movement law has been implemented in the UK through statutory 
instruments made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972.4 It is under this 
provision that the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, were made. 
These EEA Regulations set out the bulk of EU free movement rights and transpose into 
national law the Citizens’ Rights Directive 2004/38.5 Under Section 7 of the Immigration Act 
1988 those entering the UK by exercise of enforceable EU law rights or any provisions made 
under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 are exempt from the requirement 
to obtain immigration leave to enter or remain.  
 
The Immigration Bill was awaiting report and third reading stage in the Commons at the time 
of writing. The Bill was reported to the House by a Public Bill Committee without amendments 
                                                
2 It is important to note that since the conference, the Immigration Bill fell when Parliament was 
prorogued in September 2019. 
3 The Immigration and Social Security EU Coordination Bill 2017-19. The Bill from now. 
4 Section 2(2) of the ECA provides power to make orders, rules, regulations or schemes which 
implement the UK’s EU obligations. 
5 Council Directive on 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation 
(EEC) 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC 93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L158/77. 
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in March 2019. In summary, Part 1 of the Bill (clauses 1-4 and Schedule 1) would make 
provision to end the free movement of EU citizens to the UK. EU citizens would be brought 
under UK immigration law and require immigration permission to enter and remain in the UK. 
Part 1 would also confirm the status of Irish citizens in the UK. Part 2 of the Bill (Clause 5 and 
Schedules 2 and 3) sets out the provisions on social security co-ordination.6 Part 3 of the Bill 
(Clauses 6 and 7) sets out the general provisions on interpretation and commencement.  
 
As the purpose of the Bill is to repeal free movement and bring EU citizens under the control 
of domestic immigration law, the Bill would be implemented if the Withdrawal Agreement is 
ratified or in the event of a no-deal. If the Withdrawal Agreement or another deal which 
implements a similar transition period is ratified, the Bill would be implemented at the end of 
the transition period to coincide with the introduction of the UK’s future, uniform immigration 
system from January 2021. Clause 1 and Schedule 1 are the most substantive when 
considering the end of free movement in the UK. Schedule 1 identifies the practical steps 
which need to be taken to repeal free movement. It sets out the various provisions or pieces 
of primary and secondary legislation which need amending including in EU derived domestic 
legislation, retained direct EU legislation, and EU derived rights.  
 
What does the Bill do? 
The main source of UK law implementing free movement is the Immigration EEA Regulations. 
These will be repealed in full. They should be replaced by a range of measures depending on 
the circumstances of the relevant individual such as the immigration rules for settled status 
and the future immigration system. 
 
Section 7 of the Immigration Act 1988 places EU citizens and their eligible family members 
outside of UK immigration control which is necessary to facilitate free movement. This section 
will be omitted from the 1988 Act to bring EU citizens and their family members within the 
scope of the Immigration Act 1971, meaning they will require immigration permission to enter 
and remain in the UK. The most practical significance to this change is that bringing EU 
citizens within the scope of the Immigration Act 1971 means that the Home Secretary will have 
the power to make administrative rules or regulations about EU citizens under section 3 of the 
Act being the immigration rules. 
 
                                                
6 Further information on the social security provisions social security provisions can be found 
Commons Library briefing paper prepared for 2nd reading which analyses Part 2 in detail: see 
<https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/?ContentType=Commons+Briefing+papers&Topic=European
+Union&SubTopic=EU+law+and+treaties&Year=2019&SortByAscending=false> 
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Schedule 1 performs a range of other modification and repeal functions to remove other 
references to free movement across the statute book. There are also catch-all provisions in 
Part 3 of Schedule 1 to effectively mop-up any directly effective EU law rights that may relate 
to free movement and which have been retained in the UK by virtue of the EU Withdrawal Act. 
For example, the Bill’s explanatory memorandum explains this would include rights set out in 
the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
 
Clause 2 of the Bill would insert a new section into the Immigration Act 1971 which provides 
that Irish citizens do not require leave to enter or remain in the UK. This provides an exception 
to the general rule under section 3 of the 1971 Act which requires immigration permission to 
enter or remain in the UK for non-British citizens. It also confirms the rights of Irish citizens to 
reside in the UK under the Common Travel Area. However, Irish citizens subject to a 
deportation order, exclusion order or and international travel ban will require an exemption to 
this new section, meaning that they are not entitled to enter without leave. The Bill ensures 
that Irish citizens who enter the UK from any country would be covered by the Common Travel 
Area to close this gap. 
 
In regards to implementation, the main policy provisions of the Bill would come into effect on 
a day appointed by the Regulations. If the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified free movement 
would continue during the implementation period until the end of 2020. In this scenario, the 
Government would not need the Bill to come into effect until the end of the implementation 
period. If there is a no-deal Brexit there will be no implementation period.7 
 
One of the more controversial aspects of the Bill has been the consequential provisions of 
Clause 4. Clause 4 allows the Government to amend primary and secondary legislation by 
statutory instrument. Delegated powers that enable ministers to amend primary legislation via 
secondary legislation are referred to as “Henry VIII powers” and have sometimes (but not 
always) proved controversial – particularly if the powers are very wide-ranging.8 They are seen 
by their critics as transferring legislative power from Parliament to Government.   
 
What does this mean for settled status? 
The Bill is silent on settled status. Settled status has been implemented in the immigration 
                                                
7 Following the change in government on 24 July 2019, a plan to end free movement immediately 
without a transition period has been announced. See ‘No deal immigration arrangements for EU 
citizens moving to the UK after Brexit’ (5 September 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/no-deal-immigration-arrangements-for-eu-citizens-
moving-to-the-uk-after-brexit> accessed 13 September 2019. 
8 For more information, see https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/henry-viii-clauses/.  
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rules and all the substantive law on settled status and the future immigration system is or will 
be laid out under the rules. However, the Bill facilitates the change from EU law to UK domestic 
law, repealing UK law which implements free movement in order to bring EU citizens under 
domestic immigration law, and require them to have leave to enter or remain in the UK.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The Bills numerous functions also raises some interesting questions in the context of settled 
status and a no-deal Brexit. The Government has extended the settled status scheme in the 
event of a no-deal Brexit but without the Withdrawal Agreement there would be no 
underpinning international law obligations to implement the scheme. The settled status 
scheme would remain only in the immigration rules and subject to changes, although the 
Government has stated that it is not their intention to do so. 
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2) The automated residency checks in the EU Settlement Scheme 
Paul Erdunast, Legal and Parliamentary Officer, Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association 
 
Introduction 
Erdunast pointed out that that the automated residency checks have a crucial effect as to 
whether vulnerable groups are able to maintain settled status during the transition period. 
Erdunast gave a detailed explanation as to how the checks work while also pointing out how 
these required checks may have a differential impact on vulnerable citizens.  
 
Automated checks 
The first step of the automated checks requires that the applicant gives the Home Office; 
• Forename 
• Surname 
• Date of birth 
• Any previously held or other names 
• National Insurance number9 
 
During the second part of the process, the Home Office collects the information listed above 
on the applicant and sends it to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) which then 
builds a ‘footprint’ of residence based on employment, Pay As You Earn (PAYE), and self-
assessment details held by HMRC only. Then, only if PAYE records or self-assessment return 
can be found for that tax year, the applicant is marked as resident for that year. In other words, 
the Home Office puts this information from the HMRC into a residency footprint algorithm 
which gives and automatic calculation for how many months and years the applicant has been 
in the UK. 
 
Significantly, it is the HMRC, not the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), which holds 
the records for child benefits, child tax credits and working tax credits. In order words, it is the 
HMRC, not the DWP information residency footprint algorithm which feeds into these 
residency checks which in turn feeds into and decide the applicant’s status. Therefore, this 
allows the Home Office to prevent benefits such as child benefits or other welfare benefits 
held by the DWP to feed into the residency checks. This creates a differential impact on for 
example, women who receive child support. 
 
                                                
9 Optional but required for the residency check. Without a National Insurance number there can be no 
residency check. 
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However, and as Erdunast pointed out, there is no principled reason why benefit records held 
by DWP but not HRMC should form an automatic picture of an applicant’s residence in the 
UK. In ILPA’s view, this brings disparity to how benefits are treated compared to work earnings 
including pensions. The sooner that the Home Office can add DWP information to what the 
HRMC send to the Home Office, the sooner this can help vulnerable citizens. 
 
For now, the DWP information works differently than the HRMC with the algorithm and does 
not allow accurate information to be transmitted to the residency algorithm which provides the 
residency result. Therefore, people who have been living in the UK might receive and 
inaccurate outcome stating that they have less than five years of residency. In addition to this, 
the third step of the application process requires that if the HRMC checks do not show five-
year residency, a footprint is sent to the DWP. The disparity between treatment of HRMC and 
DWP records give cause for concern about differential impact on women and those with other 
protected characteristics who depend on benefits to survive in the UK.  
 
The fourth step requires that this DWP footprint is added to the HMRC footprint and sent to 
the Home Office where it is seen by one of their caseworkers in the form of a table, not the 
applicant. The applicant will only receive the outcome not any reasons as to why. The 
caseworker sees a table such as the one below: 
 
 
The problem with this system is that an applicant who has been born in the United Kingdom 
could have an outcome which simply claims that Home Office records show that they have 
been continuously resident in the UK for less than five years and that they will only be 
considered for pre-settled status. Only if they challenge the result of the check choosing to 
send in additional evidence of residence is the applicant given the option to provide evidence 
of residence for each year they claimed to live in the UK. ILPA has concluded that due to this 
2019/03 
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application system, there is disparity to how benefits are treated compared to work. If the 
Home Office is looking to protect vulnerable people, they need to address this disparity. 
 
Concluding remarks and proposals for change 
ILPA, therefore, concludes the following: 
1. ILPA has previously asked for meaningful public information on the automated 
residency checks and the Home Office provided some of the information asked for.10 
2. The Home Office should provide applicants with the table that the Home Office 
caseworkers see, at the first opportunity, so that they can understand why they may 
have failed the check and whether there are inaccuracies in the results due to the 
information held. 
3. The Home Office should give reasons why the applicant did not pass the checks to 
allow applicants the best chance of obtaining settled status and have the opportunity 
to collect evidence for a more accurate check. 
4. The Home Office should make it easy and quick for applicants to request HMRC and 
DWP records so that incorrect information about the applicants can quickly be rectified 
before they apply. For example, the Government gives a list of reasons for possible 
data matching errors, all of which could be out of the applicant’s control, particularly 
women who are more likely to be dependence on benefit claims such as a Housing 
Benefit or Universal Credit claim.  
5. Finally, ILPA proposes that the Home Office do a 6-monthly audit into the operation of 
the check which would enable the Home Office to make improvements to the systems 
accuracy, so that it succeeds for more applicants. This will prove more and more 
effective, and needed the closer to the end of the application window we reach. 
 
  
                                                
10 See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/eu-settlement-scheme-uk-tax-and-benefits-records-automated-
check#how-the-automated-check-calculates-the-period-of-residence. 
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3) EU Settlement Scheme: practical and emotional challenges 
Christopher Desira, Director, Seraphus Solicitors 
 
Desira is the solicitor and director of Seraphus, a firm specialising in legal and policy advice 
relating to UK immigration, asylum and EU law. He works for the European Representation 
office in London and has work with and EEA and EU Swiss embassies.  
 
The EU Settlement Scheme – not so simple 
The Home Office intended for the EU Settlement Scheme to be as simple as possible stating 
that they are looking to grant applications and not to refuse them. However, the actual process 
and the required evidence need to be further analysed. As Erdunast also pointed out, the EU 
Settlement Scheme still requires applicants to prove eligibility and that the applicant has been 
in the UK for the time that they state they have been. It is clear how these requirements may 
be more than just simple obstacles for some. In other words, the process is much more 
complex than the three-step plan which the Home Office proposes.11 In fact, applying for the 
EU Settlement Scheme is a very complex process and those challenges are best illustrated 
when engaging with the millions of individual backgrounds that need to fit into a one-fits-all 
scheme. 
 
Obstacles to the scheme and groups affected 
Some examples of groups who have problems with the application and who have been left 
out of the communication campaigns led by the Home Office include those with dual EU & 
third country nationality citizens, for example, those with dual Dutch and Somali nationality. 
These are individuals who have acquired EU citizenship somewhere along the paths of their 
lives and have a European passport but are unaware that they have to prove their status in 
the United Kingdom. They know they can live in the United Kingdom based on their passport 
but do not link Brexit with the ending of those rights. 
 
Other groups include vulnerable citizens, such as the East Timor community in Europe, many 
of who have Portuguese nationality which provided them with access, but do not know enough 
about domestic law to know that they need or are eligible to apply. These are communities 
which are usually patriarchal and which have created conflicts within family units, spoken to 
some worried that the head of the family who hold their passports will not apply or will forget 
to apply.  Desira also briefly summarised his work with other vulnerable groups. He found that 
                                                
11 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/home-office-publishes-details-of-settlement-scheme-for-
eu-citizens. 
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certain groups of people have problems with proving residence and identity due to their 
lifestyle. This has caused for some communities to become even more withdrawn from society. 
 
Other groups of vulnerable citizens who will have problems with the application process are 
those who lack the capacity to understand the process, notwithstanding their inabilities to 
engage with the application procedure. In addition, individuals and institutions caring for these 
individuals including family members, carers, local authorities, social workers and mental 
health institutions may or may not have the legal ability to act on their behalf to aid them with 
the application may not be able to be much help. Desira found during his work that social 
workers are not well equipped to aid incapacitated individuals on their behalf as their 
knowledge of the scheme is still lacking. Most social workers who have not received training 
or assistance to aid people with the application process and have rarely to have obtained 
evidence or the nationality of the child. 
 
However, Desira also found that it’s not just those with offences or alternative lifestyles that 
may be deterred from applying to the scheme. Applying to the Scheme has also been a 
challenge for long-term residents. Desira found that there is reluctance or even a refusal from 
long-term/older residents to engage with the scheme. Here, again, communication efforts 
made by the Home Office have failed to explain the necessity of the scheme. Communication 
is mainly framed around explaining to individuals how to prove their rights to work or to rent. 
However, these are no longer concerns for many long-term residents. Even those who have 
the necessary documents, through no fault of their own will find themselves being locked out 
of the Scheme. Another key group who have severe obstacles with the application is third 
country citizens who are whose status depends on their partners who may not want to help 
them, who are abusive, or who have abandoned them. For example, a third country national 
spouse of an EU citizen, which relies on the cooperation of that person but is no longer with 
that EU citizen due to relationship breakdown. 
 
Based on the aforementioned scenarios one can see how women and children as well as 
minority groups are going to be the hardest hit in this scheme, especially women who are 
victims of domestic violence. However, Desira pointed out that these categories fail to touch 
on the full extent of the work that ahead for his to get everyone who is protected under this 
scheme actually protected. Additional minority groups that Desira found to be the most at risk 
include the following non-exhaustive list: digitally illiterate, those with dependency needs, 
citizens living in isolation, those working in the informal economy, those vulnerable to 
exploitation by employers or rogue lawyers/trafficked persons, those at risk of exploitation or 
domestic violence from family members, those incorrectly believing they are British and not 
2019/03 
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required to apply, prisoners and those released from prison (particularly after the deadline), 
those detained under immigration powers, those who face higher instances of discrimination, 
particularly Eastern Europeans, those taking up residence in the UK close to the deadline, 
those living in informal living arrangements, those living in sheltered or religious communities, 
homeless persons, those living outside the UK, including family members. 
 
While the Home Office claims that those who do not apply within the deadline are allowed to 
apply late but only with good reason, one already starts thinking about the issues that this will 
cause for the aforementioned groups and whether their reasons for possibly applying late will 
be accepted by the Government. These include problems faced by members of Roma 
communities that may have been deterred from or reluctant to apply, dual EU third country 
nationals who may not have been aware they have to apply, or vulnerable women and children 
dependant on others who did not have applied at all, or long-term residents who have not 
opened up a new bank account on time. There are actually no definite protections once an 
applicant applies late and the excuse will only be accepted in extreme situations.  
 
Desira also hypothesises that new groups who have not applied to the Scheme but should 
have will be revealed. Desira also pointed out that no other registration scheme has achieved 
100% take up in the past. From previous registration systems, the most common reasons for 
applicants late submission was due to a major life change, at a point when a child was reaching 
higher education, a person who was in the process of applying for a pension, someone 
requiring non-emergency treatment, and a person who was applying for a new job or buying 
a new home. 
 
The new immigration system and the EU Settlement Scheme 
The new immigration system will lock out any EU citizens without pre-existing leave. It will give 
those EU citizens that have current status in the country pre-settled status and those with at 
least five years of residence settled status. Upon refusal, an applicant has the right to appeal 
the decision. However, from his experience as an immigration solicitor, Desira explains that 
many of these applications will not be accepted by the courts or the Home Office, and the 
appellant would usually be facing years of appeals. 
 
Even those who acquire pre-settled or settled status may also have problems. This means 
that the support that the Home Office claims to be offering towards the application and the 
required support for vulnerable EU citizens which have been discussed at this roundtable will 
be needed for years to come and is not a short term issue. 
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Concluding remarks 
As mentioned above, the application process for the EU Settlement Scheme is not as simple 
or as easy as the Home Office has tried to make it seem. Through his experience in trying to 
aid and inform individuals in the UK about the EU Settlement Scheme, Desira found that the 
largest general issues were lack of awareness, emotional consequences/distress, fear, not 
understanding why they need to apply and dependency. Communication campaigns led so far 
by the government have left out big categories of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable 
individuals. This is why it is very important at this stage to inform people about the scheme 
and provide them with adequate support to apply while acknowledging the difficulties that 
vulnerable groups face. We need to work on notifying people of the process immediately. 
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B. EXPERIENCING IMMIGRATION IN THE UK – VIEWS FROM THE GROUND 
 
1) The impact of the EU Settlement Scheme on women: policy and practice 
Nicole Masri, Legal Officer, Rights of Women 
 
Rights of Women is a women’s voluntary organisation committed to securing equality, justice 
and safety in the law for women. They offer free confidential legal advice to women on their 
advice lines. Rights of women covers three main areas of law - family law, criminal law, and 
immigration and asylum law. In addition to their advice services, they provide training to 
professionals and provide guidance to policy makers. A high proportion of the women who 
access the services of Rights of Women are victims of gender-based abuse. 
 
Introduction 
Through their work engaging with the government on issues affecting migrant women, Rights 
of Women were invited to join the Home Office’s safeguarding user group which was set up 
over a year ago to address the needs of vulnerable people in the context of the EU Settlement 
Scheme. Since that time, they have been analysing the law, policy and implementation of the 
EU Settlement scheme. In their analysis, there have been various categories of women 
identified that are at risk of failing to secure any status under the scheme or are at risk of failing 
to secure full settled status. 
 
Women who are unaware of the need to apply  
There are numerous reasons why people will not be aware of the need to apply to the scheme.  
In Masri’s experience so far, very few of the women who use their advice services know about 
the EU Settlement Scheme or that the UK’s exit from the EU would affect their immigration 
status. The more common presenting need relates to accessing benefits or wanting to 
understand the impact of relationship breakdown on their immigration status and entitlement 
to benefits. They have observed little difference since the Government’s mass 
communications campaign launched this year. 
 
A lack of awareness of the Scheme will affect some vulnerable women in particular. 
Perpetrators of abuse commonly use immigration status to control their victims. They often 
see victims of domestic abuse kept in the dark about the need to make immigration 
applications, victims prevented from making immigration application or deceived by 
perpetrators into thinking applications have been made on their behalf. These types of cases 
will emerge after the deadline for application. These cases are most likely to come to light in 
circumstances where a woman has contact with an arm of the State, for example, in an 
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application for benefits, or with a private body undertaking immigration checks, for example, 
an employer. 
 
Under the Withdrawal Agreement, there will be, if implemented, a power to accept out of time 
applications for good reason. Masri notes that she is not aware of the same commitment being 
made explicit in the context of a no-deal scenario. While there is still some time from the 
deadline for applications, the organisations concerns have not been assuaged by 
government’s attitude to preparing for out of time applicants. In their stakeholder meetings, 
the Home Office has informed Rights of Women that it has no intention on consulting with 
representative groups on its approach to out of time applications. 
 
The organisation have pressed government for policy guidance ensuring that vulnerabilities, 
such as being a victim of domestic abuse or modern slavery, are properly identified as forming 
reasonable grounds for missing the deadline. They also want to see legislation to protect out 
of time applicants from losing lawful residence in the UK in the period between the deadline 
for applications and an out of time application.  
 
Women who have difficulty applying to the EU settlement scheme 
An application-based system that places the burden of proof entirely on applicants leaves 
many vulnerable women facing serious barriers to successfully securing status.  
 
a) Lack evidence of own identity & nationality and that of their children:  
 
The two most common situations Rights of Women comes across are women who have had 
identity documents removed from their control by perpetrators of abuse; and women who 
cannot obtain identity documents for their children where an abusive or uncooperative father’s 
consent is required by the issuing nation.  
 
Rights of Women was one of seven community organisations that participated in the second 
private beta testing phase in November and December 2018. During PB2, they supported 12 
women to apply to the EU settlement scheme. Amongst the 12 women, they had eight children 
who needed to make an application to the EU Settlement Scheme. They were only able to 
assist half of those children to apply with their mothers because the other half did not have a 
valid passport. Of the four children who couldn’t apply because they didn’t have a valid 
passport, in three cases it was because their fathers’ consent was required to obtain a new 
passport. The children’s mothers were unable to document them because they were 
estranged from the children’s fathers because of domestic abuse.  
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Unlike now, during PB2, it was a mandatory requirement to have a valid passport. Now the 
children could seek to rely on the Home Office’s power to accept alternative evidence of their 
identity and nationality. The Home Office’s approach to the exercise of this power will require 
close scrutiny. 
 
At present, due to their experience in applying for the scheme the Rights of Women remain 
concerned that the exercise of the power to accept alternative evidence of identity and 
nationality lacks transparency and accountability. Applicants who do not have a valid identity 
document cannot apply online. They need to request a paper form to apply and can only do 
so by persuading the Settlement Resolution Centre staff that they qualify for the exercise of 
discretion. If the Settlement Resolution Centre refuses to issue a paper application form there 
is no written decision explaining why.   
 
b) Lack evidence of own residence: 
 
As was mentioned by Erdunast, for women, the fact the HMRC checks do not include tax 
credits or child benefit as well as the limited evidential value attached to most DWP benefits 
undermines the utility of the checks. The effect is that women face a disproportionate burden 
of proving their residence.  
 
Government’s report of the second private beta testing phase, published on 21 January 2019 
confirmed that of all the decisions made by that time in the private beta two cohort of 
applicants,12 84% did not need to provide any additional evidence of UK residence because 
the decision was made on the basis of the automated data checks or because the applicant 
already had a valid permanent residence document or indefinite leave to remain.  
 
Rights of Women’s experience during PB2 was markedly different. Of the 12 women 
supported to make applications, 10 needed to provide additional evidence of their residence 
– 83% of applicants in the client group did need to provide additional evidence of residence.  
 
The clients’ circumstances from the Rights of Women varied. They included women with 
periods of self-employment, informal cash in hand work, periods of unemployment due to child 
care, periods of unemployment due to abuse and destitution or homelessness, periods of 
                                                
12 Home Office, ‘EU Settlement Scheme private beta testing phase 2 report’ (21 January 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eu-settlement-scheme-private-beta-2/eu-settlement-
scheme-private-beta-testing-phase-2-report> accessed 27 August 2019. 
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unemployment due to ill health, periods receiving benefits that were not included in the 
automated data checks e.g. tax credits and child benefit and periods receiving benefits that 
would have been identified on the automated data checks but limited evidential value would 
have been ascribed to them e.g. housing benefit, income support.  
 
Of the 12 women Rights of Women supported to make an application, two women did not 
have to provide additional evidence because they were both in work at the time of the 
application and eligible for pre-settled status only. The evidential burden on them was lower 
for pre-settled status because they only needed to prove they were resident in the UK in the 
last six months. In both cases, the fact they were in work and on the payroll in the last six 
months meant the automated data checks were effective for them. Masri states that from her 
experience and from the experience of the organisation of monitoring the effectiveness of the 
automated data checks demonstrates the importance of disaggregating data by type of status.  
 
Of the 12 women the organisation supported to make applications during private beta two, 
eight had resided in the UK for a continuous period of five years and were eligible for settled 
status. Each and every one of these eight women had to provide additional evidence of their 
residence in the UK because the automated data checks did not confirm their eligibility for 
settled status.  
 
In the context of the disproportionate burden on women to provide evidence of their residence, 
the Home Office’s approach to evidence is critical. The Home Office has gone on record 
repeatedly that they will be cooperative and apply discretion. However, Rights of Women have 
in turn repeatedly raised their concern that when government’s user facing and caseworker 
guidance is all but silent on how discretion would be exercised there is a considerable risk that 
it is exercised unfairly and inconsistently.  
 
There were early signs of positive practical experiences during private beta two for the 
organisations clients who had the benefit of legal representation in a controlled pilot. From the 
PB2 casework there were examples of Home Office decision-makers checking Home Office 
records for evidence of past applications. There were also cases where there were gaps in 
evidence provided that did not prevent a grant. While this was from the practical experience 
of the Rights of women, Masri notes that there is no evidence that this is a formal approach 
adopted by the Home Office because it has not yet agreed to include the approach in its 
published guidance. This leads to uncertainty and inconsistency when some applicants will 
receive the benefit of this assistance and others will not.  
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Masri, on behalf of Rights of Women, argues that one of the most important safeguards to 
preventing vulnerable people from failing to secure status under the EU Settlement Scheme, 
is for the Home Secretary to accept a duty to make reasonable enquiries on behalf of an 
applicant to satisfy himself, where it is necessary to do so, if the applicant’s own identity and 
nationality and continuity of residence (and where necessary, on behalf of a non-EU citizen, 
the identity, national and residence of an EU citizen family member). 
 
c) Non-EU nationals who lack evidence relating to a family member: 
 
Non-EU national family members are a category at high risk of failing to secure status under 
the scheme because of a lack of evidence. The evidential burden on non-EU citizens is much 
greater than that on EU citizens because their eligibility is dependent on an EU citizen. The 
Home Office has created a system that is geared primarily towards family members applying 
together. The system is more difficult to navigate for non-EU national family members who 
may be estranged from their EU citizen family member and need to apply separately. If a 
woman is separated from an abusive partner, she may have no way, without the assistance 
of the State, of proving his identity and nationality and residence. This will also be true of 
women still trapped in abusive relationships.  
 
The safeguard Rights of Women proposes as a duty on the Home Office to make reasonable 
enquiries is critical for non-EU nationals estranged from their EU citizen family members. 
However, the user facing and caseworker guidance is silent on what, if any support, the Home 
Office will offer family members who cannot access documents from EU citizens. For example, 
it could, but doesn’t, offer to check its own Home Office records, HMRC or DWP records. 
 
Even if the Home Office agreed to undertake enquiries on behalf of non-EU family members, 
checks may come back negative. For example, an EU citizen may not have applied to the 
scheme or the EU family member may be Irish and have no need to ever apply to the scheme. 
In instances such as this, it would be expected that the Home Office to give appropriate 
consideration to its powers to grant leave outside the rules taking into account the best 
interests of any children involved. Unsurprisingly, we have seen no evidence of the Home 
Office’s willingness to address any alternative grounds in applications made under the EU 
settlement scheme.   
 
d) Women who cannot meet the eligibility criteria because of relationship breakdown: 
 
Aside from those who are refused on grounds of serious or persistent criminality, EU citizens 
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are in principle able to meet the eligibility criteria independently. As we know, this is because 
as a matter of domestic policy, the UK government has introduced more favourable eligibility 
criteria than those agreed in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. EU citizens need to demonstrate 
they have lived in the UK for six months in any year of their residence to qualify.  
 
Each EU citizen woman who used to rely on a partner for her right to reside, can now qualify 
under the scheme in her own right. Rights of Women welcome this policy decision because, 
from an immigration status perspective, it severs the tie of dependency some women had to 
their partners.  
 
The same does not apply to non-EU citizens. They can fall outside the scope of the EU 
settlement scheme because their eligibility depends on maintaining a family relationship with 
an EU citizen in the UK. This has caused a concern that this will disproportionately 
disadvantage non-EU national women and put victims of domestic violence at risk. Victims of 
domestic abuse need safe and secure routes to exit abusive relationships rather than a 
scheme that compels them to stay in abusive relationships or face removal from the UK.  
 
There are three categories of non-EU national women that Rights of Women is particularly 
concerned about from their experience:  
 
a) Non-EU national spouse who separates from an abusive EU citizen husband before 
residing in the UK for 5 years:  
• Not eligible under the EU Settlement Scheme 
• If the EU citizen perpetrator husband leaves the UK or loses his EU nationality 
by naturalisation before divorce proceedings are commenced.  
 
b) Non-EU national unmarried ‘durable’ partner who separates from an abusive EU 
citizen partner before residing in the UK for five years: 
• Not eligible under the EU Settlement Scheme  
 
c) Non-EU national child who is estranged from (and not dependent on) an abusive EU 
citizen parent or step-parent: 
• Not eligible under the EU Settlement Scheme  
• If she turns 21 before residing in the UK for five years 
 
Masri points out that the organisation consistently advocated for protection to be given to these 
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groups of vulnerable women to ensure they can regularise their status independently from the 
perpetrator of abuse. 
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2) Administrative justice and the EU Settlement Scheme 
Ollie Persey, Pupil Barrister, Public Law Project 
 
Introduction 
Working as a Pupil Barrister at the Public Law Project, Persey has worked on statutory 
instrument filtering and tracking (making secondary legislation to effectively rewrite 
constitutional laws). Persey states that that the government seems to view the EU Settlement 
Scheme as a model for the future. In fact, the government stated the EU Settlement Scheme 
“sets the tone for the design and values of the new immigration system that we will implement 
from 2021.”13 
 
The legislative and policy design for the EU Settlement Scheme (i.e. the form of the rules) 
The legislative and policy design for the scheme is made up of Draft Withdrawal Agreement 
March 2018 and the immigration rules as covered by Wilkins. The substance of the legislative 
design is made up of both the pre-settled and settled status and the interplay between the two.  
 
The temporal limitations for the EU Settlement Scheme involve mainly the time limits for the 
application. The consequences for out of time applications are still unclear and under what 
circumstances they will be accepted has not yet been decided. Persey also notes that 
registration and decision making on status is determined by an online “streamlined” 
application.  
 
During the initial decision-making stages of the application, Persey found that applicants 
submit a highly variable quality of evidence. The automated application uses an algorithm to 
check DWP and HMRC databases after it requests that the applicant provide their name, date 
of birth, and national insurance number. The technological challenges associated with 
providing such information in this way has been previously discussed.14 
 
Redress – administrative review, tribunal appeals and judicial review for the EU Settlement 
Scheme 
The types of redress available within the United Kingdom is the tribunal right of appeal, 
administrative review and judicial review. However, there does not seem to be an existing 
intention from the government to secure the right of appeal for individuals applying to the EU 
Settlement Scheme. Persey states that there needs to be an appeal right for all people 
                                                
13 HM Government, The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System (Cm 9722, December 2018) 
[9.19]. 
14 See Erdunast’s contribution above. 
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required to apply to the EU Settlement Scheme and those who are granted pre-settled and 
settled status. On a more positive note, in the event of a deal the primary redress which will 
most likely be available is administrative review. However, as Persey put forward, 
administrative review is only the Home Office “marking its own homework” and is not and 
adequate form of redress alone. In addition, administrative review is not available for all types 
of government decisions made, only challenging eligibility NOT suitability.  In addition, for now, 
it is not clear whether this form of redress will even available in the event of the United Kingdom 
leaving the EU. While the tribunal right of appeal is more robust and independent and is a 
more satisfactory form of redress, this may never be available for those exposed to the 
scheme. While over three million citizens asking for right of appeal, the government has 
consistently responded with if “no deal, no appeal.” In fact, that is the generally considered 
acceptable within the current political sphere.  
 
Concluding remarks and questions for the future 
The main way of securing the right of appeal in the United Kingdom is through a Bill which has 
yet to be passed and go through both Houses of Parliament. While there is an amendment 
being pushed forward for the new Immigration Bill, the bill is not going to be passed any time 
soon. Furthermore, as stated before the government has not expressed a clear intention for 
implementing appeal rights at all while stating that appeal rights existing in more than one 
place for the scheme would be confusing and that, for that reason, tribunal rights will most 
likely be inaccessible. This again, is problematic when one considers the aforementioned 
limitations of the administrative appeal system and considers the narrow legality grounds 
within which Judicial Review can be available. Two of the key questions for the Home Office 
are firstly, how should a right of appeal be introduced in the mean time? And secondly, is there 
any intention on behalf of the government to implement appeal rights at all?   
 
While the government has repeatedly stated that there is a right to reapply for the scheme and 
so an extensive appeal system is not needed, Persey’s experience with the application so far 
is that the system is not currently functioning in a way which will allow individuals to reapply. 
The second question for concern then is whether the government will ensure that the 
reapplication process so available for those applicants who have been refused. 
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3) Brexit and vulnerable EU citizens 
Katarzyna Zagrodniczek, Immigration Programme Manager for the East European Resource 
Centre (EERC) 
 
The EERC is a charity that provides information, advice and support to the most vulnerable 
people from Central and Eastern European from the 2004 and 2007 EU accession countries: 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. The EERC is one of the 57 organisations in the UK who have been awarded 
funding from the Home Office to support vulnerable EU citizens to apply for settled status. 
This funding has been put towards; advice and support lines which help individuals with their 
application, workshops for Eastern European citizens to inform them about their rights, and 
extensive outreach. 
 
Introduction 
While the Home Office claims that the EU Settlement Scheme application process is simple 
and user friendly, the EERC has noticed that the claim is not true when it comes to vulnerable 
EU citizens. Generally, the organisation has noticed that many clients are not able to access 
mainstream services and complete the application process successfully. After the Brexit 
referendum the EERC noticed a raise in hate crime, EU nationals being asked about 
permanent residency during interviews, landlords refusing to rent properties to EU nationals, 
challenges related to settled status. At the same time, the Government has required EU 
nationals to apply for settled status in order to be able to stay in the country after Brexit. 
 
Key problems with EU Settlement Scheme 
In fact, the key issues seem to be language, awareness, accessibility, problems with 
application, problems with eligibility, proving identity with valid documents, and residence. Out 
of this list awareness and accessibility seem to be the greatest obstacles for vulnerable EEA 
citizens. 
 
Awareness 
There is lack of awareness of what even Brexit is among many vulnerable Eastern European 
citizens. There is also limited understanding of what settled status is among vulnerable 
Eastern Europeans and why they even need to apply. In fact, many EU nationals who believe 
they are excluded from the application process when they are not such as children, long term 
residents, permanent residents, people with properties in the UK, people with a British spouse 
or children who are already British nationals. 
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The main problem with this lack of awareness stems from the fact that there has been no 
obligation to apply for any status until now. The Government’s message after the Brexit 
referendum was that “you do not need to do anything now.” Another key problem is that there 
are data sharing fears among vulnerable citizens. Those that are dependent on social care, 
benefits, those with criminal convictions but also and victims of modern slavery are worried 
about the application process and so are too scared to apply. In addition, individuals are very 
scared about the nature of a digital status. It is confusing that there is no document, actual 
code or number, just a web page. 
 
Accessibility  
There are also key barriers to accessing the scheme which have been discovered by the 
EERC. Key barriers for this group of vulnerable people from even accessing information about 
the scheme is language barriers, disabilities, and illiteracy including IT illiteracy. 
 
Problems with the application 
Issues with the application itself have prevented many from following through with the 
application process for the EU settlement scheme correctly or at all. Reasons for this include 
digital exclusion, no access to mobile phones, no personal email, no access to internet, 
problems with using Identity Verification App (especially reading the chip), scanning faces, 
taking a picture, problems with uploading documents/evidence. Only 10 documents are 
allowed for this section, asking difficult for some to provide full evidentiary support. 
 
The description of evidence about which period of time the document is confirming is very 
difficult for clients with limited English as they may not understand documents that they are 
submitting. As outlined by Erdunast, due to the inaccuracy of HRMC records, people have 
become too scared to apply due to other people’s negative experiences. For example, for self- 
employed individuals who haven’t submitted their latest tax return before applying. HRMC 
cannot find data for the last six months, which is inaccurate. This creates fear and distrust in 
people when it comes to the system. Furthermore, majority of clients have noticed that emails 
from the Home Office all go to spam or junk folder and do not get seen. In case of any other 
IT issues the Settlement Resolution Centre often advises you to use a different laptop or phone 
or to reinstall the app. 
 
Problems with eligibility 
Those without an ID or sufficient documentation to prove their residence at the time of the 
application also tend to see inaccurate results or get discouraged from applying at all. 
However, not having an ID or lacking sufficient documentation does not automatically exclude 
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someone from having five year residency in the UK. 
 
Furthermore, it is the more vulnerable EU citizen that is more likely to lack official 
documentation despite actually having five-year residency. For example, the type of applicants 
found to not have evidence of their residence are victims of marital abuse and domestic 
violence, victims of labour exploitation, casual workers paid cash in hand, individuals with no 
bank account, people without proof of address, homeless people and people in precarious 
housing, family members providing unpaid care to people with long-term ill health or 
disabilities; grandparents caring for their children, people not in education, employment or 
training, not claiming any benefits living with their family members. This is not an exhaustive 
list. 
 
Conclusion 
While the Home Office has taken steps to aid vulnerable Eastern European citizens, there are 
still serious obstacles for these citizens when it comes to the EU Settlement Scheme. The 
application process seems to set unrealistic expectations for those who are vulnerable and at-
risk. These people may not even realise or understand that they will lose their status in the 
country if the application is not completed. 
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4) Roma and Brexit Campaigning and Policy Project15 
Mihai Calin Bica, Campaigning and Advocacy Project Worker, Roma Support Group 
 
Introduction 
Roma Support Group (RSG) is the first and largest charity working with and for the Roma 
community in the UK since 1998.  Following the Brexit referendum in 2016, RSG has engaged 
community members in debates and information sessions regarding Brexit and rights of EU 
citizens’ rights in the UK after Brexit, meeting hundreds of Roma community members and 
also being one of the main actors of an event organised in July 2018 in Parliament regarding 
Brexit and issues concerning the Roma community.16 
 
RSG and PB2 testing of the EU Settlement Scheme application 
As part of the EU Settlement Scheme development process, in early October 2018, RSG was 
invited to take part in the PB2 testing of the EU Settlement Scheme application, which consists 
of identity checks through a smartphone app, and the completion of an online application form.   
 
The testing period lasted from 15 November to 21 December 2018. While the organisations 
initial aim was to support 20 applicants through the process, they ultimately recruited 69 
service users for participation in the testing, submitting 64 applications. One application could 
not be submitted due to numerous technical errors. Another approximately 40 potential 
applicants were turned away as RSG was at full capacity in terms of the numbers of people it 
could handle at the time. 
 
RSG applied broad criteria in recruiting participants; having: 
• A valid passport,   
• A valid email address,   
• The ability to pay the (then) £65 application fee.17 
 
Participants’ profiles encompassed a wide range of backgrounds, ranging from people with 
regular full-time employment to those who had only worked temporary cash-in-hand jobs, or 
were on benefits. It is important to remember that many of these most vulnerable service users 
would have been unable to access the testing phase due to lack of appropriate identification 
                                                
15 The text of this contribution is also based on a report produced by Mihai Calin Bica, Sarah Zawacki 
& Andy Shallice for the Roma Support Group in January 2019.  
16 Philip Brown, Andy Shallice, Gill Brown, Arthur Ivatts, ‘Roma and Brexit Report’ (July 2018) 
<https://www.gypsy-traveller.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/APPG-Brexit-and-Roma-Report-1.pdf> 
17 This fee has since been scrapped, see https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46950719.  
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documents and inability to pay the application fee. 
 
As such, RSG was unable to include rough sleeping Roma in PB2 testing. Rough sleepers 
will largely need to be approached through street outreach, yet the current organisational 
capacity does not allow for extensive outreach work. Furthermore, many rough sleepers will 
lack the necessary documentation for completing their settled status applications, thus 
requiring much more intensive support than RSG were able to provide. 
 
Bica notes that as an organisation, RSG was overwhelmed by demand from their service users 
for support in completing the application. Even after the beta testing period ended, they still 
received requests for help in completing the application.  
 
RSG staff asked all applicants at the outset to attempt to complete applications as 
independently as possible. Out of the total of 64 applications submitted, only two applicants 
were able to complete the application without any assistance, and four were able to complete 
parts of the application (e.g. they were able to enter their phone numbers, their email 
addresses or take photos of themselves). The remaining 58 applicants required assistance 
with all stages of the application process. These issues were both broadly attributable to 
language barriers and digital-related barriers. Identifying, scanning and uploading additional 
supporting documentation created some significant barriers to completion of the application.  
Applicants did not know which documents were relevant for inclusion or what period of time 
was covered by each document, nor did they have the IT skills to scan and upload documents 
to the application form.     
 
55 applicants intended to obtain settled status, with the remaining nine applying for pre-settled 
status. 23 applications faced technical errors with regard to DWP and HMRC checks. Out of 
these, six revealed no records in HMRC or DWP data and the 17 remaining applicants 
revealed less records than expected by the applicants. This required people to upload 
additional evidence to prove their residence in the UK. Apart from this, 13 applicants met 
technical errors with regards to the application itself, like smartphone application not reading 
the passport chip, inability to scan applicant’s face, or issues regarding the online application 
such as errors when uploading documents. 
  
From the total applicants, 48 were able to submit their application during their first 
appointment, including applicants who were required to provide further evidence of their 
residence.  The average application time took around 50 minutes - ranging from 30 minutes 
to 90 minutes. The other 16 applicants required, in total, 21 further appointments in order 
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identify, scan and upload further evidence or re-submit their application following technical 
errors.  Each of these appointments took on average 60 minutes, ranging from 45 minutes to 
two hours. Also, RSG staff recorded a number of 29 calls made to the Settlement Resolution 
Centre, mainly relating to technical errors.   
 
By the last day of the testing trials, 41 applicants (out of 64 applications) had received their 
final decision. On average, it took three days for an applicant to receive a decision, with a 
spread ranging from five hours to 11 days. One applicant who received a wrong decision was 
informed about the ways to discuss or appeal it but not why they were not granted the status 
they applied for. RSG will be able to fully assess this situation once they have contact will all 
applicants. The organisation’s concern is that many of them might not be aware if they have 
received a decision or not as they do not regularly check their email accounts, and they rely 
on relatives, friends or others to do that for them. 
 
From the total of 69 applicants initially booked to be supported by RSG only 64 had their 
application submitted; one applicant was not able to submit his application due to several 
technical errors, two applicants discovered their documentation had expired during the 
appointment and two applicants cancel the appointments as they could not pay the fees. 
 
Concluding remarks 
RSG recommends that more support should be made available for a fair access of all EU 
Citizens in the UK, especially those from vulnerable groups, including the Roma, to go through 
the system as there are many more vulnerable people than initially believed.  
 
RSG recommends support designed specifically for deaf, mute or blind EU citizens living in 
the UK should be made available. They are unable to access the Settlement Resolution 
Centre. RSG also recommends that the deadline for applying for Settled Status applicants 
should extend by at least another year to 30 June 2022.  From their experience, many EU 
citizens and majority of Roma community members still do not know about the Settlement 
Scheme.  As more than a third of all their applicants were required to submit further evidence 
and further support, there are concerns of ability of the Home Office to consider and assess 
such a high volume of work in such a short period.   
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C. THE BREXIT EFFECT ON CITIZENS’ RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS IN THE 
EU AND THE UK 
 
1) Retaining rights to protection from expulsion as a fundamental right in Brexit 
Britain 
Dr Adrienne Yong, Lecturer in Law, City, University of London 
 
Introduction 
Yong’s research has focused on human rights protection post-Brexit, more specifically 
focused on EU citizens who were denied a vote in the EU referendum, but who are now likely 
to be most affected by withdrawal because of the effects on their private and family lives. Yong 
considered theories surrounding expulsion, particularly for vulnerable groups. One of the key 
questions that she tried to answer is if protection from expulsion is a fundamental right how 
can it be protect post-Brexit. 
 
Yong notes that one of the largest problems with Brexit is that protection from expulsion is 
being undermined at the expense of a perceived need of regaining state sovereignty. 
Expulsion itself is mainly about exercising control, being able to decide who stays within 
borders and who does not, and, so, is yet another way of reinstating sovereignty. The problem 
here is that when immigration and expulsion are extensively controlled and increasingly so, 
these restrictions could lead to illegality and clear breaches of human rights. She notes that 
the EU Settlement Scheme is part of this ongoing plan to retake control and to gain back the 
sovereignty perceived to be lost and states that it is a continuation of the hostile environment 
policy. Yong notes that with the loss of the protection that the EU law has offered against 
deportation after Brexit, UK law will not be offering an equal alternative and the protection 
offered within national law against expulsion will, most likely, not be adequate. 
 
Right to protection from expulsion  
Brexit will allow for the UK to no longer to be bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
only by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),18 removing the right to free 
movement and allowing for greater control and exercise of sovereignty. The right to protection 
from expulsion is a subset of the right to private and family life protected by the Charter in 
Article 7 and through the ECHR in Article 8, hence it’s challenge to sovereignty. This refers 
not to protection of individuals with an illegal status, but to legal individuals being asked or 
                                                
18 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 83/02 [2010] OJ C-83/389, Article 7 and 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
on Human Rights, as amended), Article 8 (hereafter, the ECHR). 
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forced to leave. While the right to be protected from expulsion is protected both within EU law 
in the Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights before Brexit, it is clear that 
without the protection of EU Treaty provisions, the protection offered will not be as adequate.  
 
What was originally an opportunity to liberalise immigration policies for EU citizens has now 
proven to be an opportunity to demonstrate true exercise of sovereignty. Protection from 
expulsion has both a social and legal element to it. While there is the legal element to it as 
exemplified by the legal status one may or may not receive, for example, from the EU 
Settlement Scheme, it is also a way to exercise control within the state by deciding who to 
keep in and who to keep out. As representatives of the UK government have stated, Brexit 
was about “taking back control”. 
 
Yong notes that policies on expulsion demonstrate the level of control and sovereignty of a 
nation and is an exemplification of liberal democracy.19 However, at the same time, Yong 
reminds us of the boundary paradox: there is no liberally democratic way of determining what 
the boundaries of a polity are. Yet, policies on expulsion distinguishes the outside from the 
outside and helps define what differentiates between the two. The problem is that these 
socially constructed boundaries have serious social and legal implications which may need to 
be challenged. Through her work, Yong concludes that since control and sovereignty are 
expressed through the governance of expulsion, the challenge to sovereignty must come from 
a human rights protection instead.  
 
EU versus UK Approaches 
Yong uses a case study on deportation in her research in order to show how the adequate 
protection against deportation, a form of expulsion, which exists in the EU framework, is 
absent from the UK’s.20 When it comes to deportation there is a stark difference between the 
UK and EU positions. This is in turn revealing for how human rights are perceived in each 
system’s constitutional framework, in terms of their importance.  
 
This is particularly significant because while the UK will still mostly likely be bound by the 
ECHR post-Brexit, and so bound within the boundaries of Article 8 ECHR, it will still lose 
protection from Article 7 of the Charter. This again, is crucial because the protection currently 
offered by the EU against expulsion is much higher than domestically. The EU focuses on 
                                                
19 Mae Ngai, Impossible Subjects (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
20 Orders for deportation are different from administrative removal, under Immigration and Asylum Act 
1999, s10. Deportation is often for more serious cases, and administrative removal does not disallow 
re-entry unlike deportation. 
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protection against deportation, whilst the UK has a rebuttable presumption in favour of 
deportation.21 Deportation itself and orders allowing this are also a very interesting 
phenomenon theoretically in terms of the implications for sovereignty and what it means to 
deport individuals and why.22 
 
In contrast, post-Brexit the domestic law will not be offering similarly wide protections against 
expulsion. The Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination Bill seeks to get rid of the right 
to free movement and right to all EU treaty provisions. At the same time, Appendix EU to 
Immigration Rules refuses settled status for anyone subject to expulsion order. Under the 
Home Office suitability criteria, an individual who is subject to a deportation, exclusion or 
removal decision would be refused settled status. This could mean that those subject to a 
deportation order under appeal could be refused settled status simply because of the mere 
existence of their being subject to a deportation order. Given the high propensity for these 
deportation orders to be against a number of legal provisions, not least those related to human 
rights, it would be an even further miscarriage of justice, not to mentioned breach of human 
rights in the context of rights protection if this was then the reason why an individual did not 
get settles status. 
 
The challenge of Brexit 
While Brexit will bring the denial of several human rights available within the EU Treaty 
provisions it will also provide new policies, laws and requirements which focus on who will be 
allowed in the UK borders after Brexit and who will not. One of these of course is the EU 
Settlement Scheme which ultimate focus is on those who cannot get settled status before 
official withdrawal. Yong has concluded that while vulnerable parties are most at risk for failing 
to apply successfully, there are relaxed conditions for others. Yong also notes that the 
requirements and evidence that the EU Settlement Scheme calls for demonstrates a 
hierarchical valuation of EU citizens by the Home Office, allowing for the “sifting through” of 
those considered desirable and those that are not. In other words, the EU settlement scheme 
is yet another tool within the new immigration control regime used to regaining a socially 
perceived loss of control and sovereignty. It is part of the hostile environment policy giving the 
UK government an escalated level of control over which EU citizens which will remain within 
its borders and which do not.  
 
                                                
21 Adrienne Yong, ‘Human rights protection as justice in post-Brexit Britain: a case study of 
deportation’ in Tawhida Ahmed and Fahey (eds), On Brexit: Law, Justice, and Injustices (Edward 
Elgar, 2019 forthcoming). 
22 William Walters, ‘Deportation, expulsion, and the international police of aliens’ (2002) 6 Citizenship 
studies 265, 277. 
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Concluding remarks 
There is a need for the UK to seriously consider its protection against expulsion after Brexit if 
an adequate level of human rights is to be maintained in the UK. Merely from a human rights 
standpoint, the decision not to protect such rights after Brexit is a risky one. However, it is also 
not a positive sign that there has not been the requisite attempts to protect against deportation 
pre-Brexit, suggesting that the likelihood of it being protected after Brexit is even less. There 
are grave human rights injustices if this is not something that is properly considered by the 
UK. There is a remaining political commitment to the rights under Article 8 ECHR that are 
meant to be considered before issuing an order for deportation. However, they are not often 
relied upon because the presumption in favouring of deporting rather than protecting against 
it within the UK and the fact that there is very little political will to prevent against expulsions 
does not help. 
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2) Brexit and the British in the EU-27 beyond the illusion of free movement 
Dr Michaela Benson, Reader in Sociology, Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
Introduction 
Benson presented the lesser-known story of citizens’ rights. She runs Brexit Brits Abroad 
which is an innovative research project funded by the UK in a Changing Europe23 initiative. It 
examines what Brexit, as it unfolds, entails for British citizens living and working in the EU-27, 
exploring in particular questions of citizenship, identity and belonging from a sociological 
perspective. Working with British citizens abroad since 2002, the goal of Benson’s work in this 
particular research project is to question what is exposed once the structural privileges of EU 
citizenship are removed and to draw out the uneven experience of Brexit in the lives of British 
citizenship. In this way, the project intends to highlight the instabilities of privilege.24 
 
Presenting the significance of the project, Benson explained how British immigration is very 
high and stands as the top 5 nationalities to immigrate to European countries. The problem is 
that UK citizens who live abroad and believe they have exercised their treaty rights are now 
facing removal from EU countries where they currently work, study, reside and live. Official 
statistics will tell you that approximately 900,000 British citizens were living in EU.25 
 
Benson predicted that the fallout from Brexit will outline exactly what the limitation for 
knowledge was for these citizens. This includes bringing to light how law on paper will translate 
into law and practice post Brexit and affect British citizens abroad; the uneven exceptions and 
treatment in terms of Brexit across different types of British citizens living abroad; how freedom 
of movement legislation will actually affect these citizens who were not subject to scrutiny until 
Brexit and how that may depart from how they may have thought it would be applied. In other 
words, Benson’s project examines how British citizen’s rights have changed post-
referendum—including through the enforcement of existing legislation relating to Freedom of 
Movement, how they are navigating the effect of Brexit in other countries and how varies from 
country to country. 
  
The research 
                                                
23 For further information, see http://ukandeu.ac.uk/  
24 For further information, see https://brexitbritsabroad.com  
25 ‘What information is there on British migrants living in Europe?’ (Office for National Statistics, 
January 2017) 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigrati
on/articles/whatinformationisthereonbritishmigrantslivingineurope/jan2017#number-of-british-citizens-
living-in-europe-in-2011-by-age> accessed 13 September 2019.  
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Benson’s research project examines whether and in what ways this time of social and political 
transformation in Britain is experienced by Britons resident in Europe, across a range of 
national and local settings. It questions in what ways them: re-evaluate their lives and 
citizenship; re-negotiate their identities; (re)position themselves in relation to shifting political 
realities of Europe; and navigate and manage the changing structural conditions that shape 
the possibilities for their continued residence and/or repatriations.  
 
In particular, she focussed her talk on the elements of the project looked at British people 
living in France. This entailed ethnographic fieldwork which lasted for 4 months from June 
2017–October 2018. The interviews focused on how people understood Brexit in the context 
of their lives and migrations and was designed to collect life and migrant histories. The 
interviews included questions about citizenship, identity and belonging.  
 
There were two important aspects about France which made it useful to Benson’s project. 
Firstly, it hosts the largest British population in EU-27 since 2007. Secondly, it offered a good 
example about how British individuals might fall between the gaps because, unlike other EU 
countries, there is not a registration process for EU citizens in France, and there is no 
requirement for EU nationals to register for a residence card. French law, however, rules that 
they can apply for a residence document if they wish and EU law gives them the right to obtain 
one after they have lived in France for five years or more. However, many French prefectures 
often seem to be unwilling to issue residence documents to EU nationals, even to those who 
have lawfully lived in France for more than five years. This has been a concern for 
approximately three to four years and has worsened since the Brexit vote, with UK nationals 
particularly being affected.26 
 
The study looked at both what Brexit means for British citizens already living in the EU-27 in 
terms of how a change of legal status may lead to a loss of EU citizenship; how the withdrawal 
agreement has affected and will affect British citizens rights in Europe including right to 
residence, social entitlements and employment. However, the study also looked at what Brexit 
means to British citizens living in the EU-27. In other words, the study also mainly aims to 
explore how the continued right to reside interplays with individual circumstances and how the 
protracted uncertainty has had significant impacts on the lives of these migrants. 
 
                                                
26 ‘UK and EU Citizens Still Struggle to Obtain Residence Documents in France’ (European Citizen 
Action Service, 14 June 2018) <https://ecas.org/uk-and-eu-citizens-still-struggle-to-obtain-residence-
documents-in-france> accessed 15 July 2019. 
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Therefore, the project, loosely framed, examines what the legal transformation of Brexit means 
to British citizens and how they are differently positioned post-Brexit. The general reaction 
from the British citizen community after Brexit seems to be that that they have questioned their 
sense of identity and connection to Britain (something Benson would like to look at it more 
detail) while at the same time there has not been a good level of understanding among the 
British population and what it means for their rights. The findings in France also brought to 
light the examination of structural privilege built on Britain’s position in the world and its 
position as a colonial power. Benson’s study revealed the instabilities of such a privilege by 
recognising that just as for any population, the British who live in Europe include those who 
are undoubtedly precariously positioned: those with chronic health conditions, those on very 
limited incomes, who are often not registered in the places that they lives, and those who, for 
a variety of reasons, have highly limited access to social entitlements and services. Brexit as 
a process has the potential to heighten and amplify these conditions of precarity at the same 
time, lessening temporarily or permanently, the advantages of structural privilege. 
 
The study has so far highlighted the impacts of Brexit outwit and preceding the legal 
transformation of the rights and entitlementsof British citizens. It looks at how Brexit shatters 
the illusion of freedom of movement as a level playing field revealing how Brexit as a process 
is unevenly felt and experienced. Finally, the study provides insights into how the privilege of 
British citizens living in Europe is re-constituted, enacted and embodied to reveal the 
instabilities of privilege at the level of the individual. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Benson’s work focuses on the lesser known story of Brexit and its implications for British 
citizens living in Europe. It moves beyond Brexit as a legal process—the terms on which such 
Britons are currently able to live in other European member states. It examines how the British 
sense of legal identity and citizenship may be transformed as their European citizenship is 
removed, tracing what is exposed once the illusion of free movement is shattered. In legal 
terms, Brexit marks a moment when these Britons are reclassified as migrants in the places 
they live and work and the structural privileges that they previously held as British (European) 
citizens are reframed. The project is based on findings during qualitative research with British 
citizens living in the EU-27. As Benson argues, to make sense of how Brexit is experienced 
by those who have moved under the mantle of freedom of movement and with what effects 
this has on their everyday lives, requires a relational perspective that takes seriously the 
hierarchies of belonging beyond nationality that shape migrant experience. 
2019/03 
39 www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
3) Unsettled Status? Who is at risk in the Settlement Scheme? 
Madeleine Sumption, Director, Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford. 
 
Introduction 
Sumption’s research focused on cataloguing which groups of people are at risk of not securing 
settled status might be and collecting data on the size of these groups. An important caveat is 
that the size of vulnerable groups is likely to be underestimated in available data sources. 
 
Evidence 
Sumption concluded that in order to secure settled or pre-settled status, EU citizens wishing 
to maintain status in the country would need to know or want to apply, be eligible to apply and 
have the specific evidence required by the Home Office. When it comes to the evidence 
required for the EU settlement scheme application, the Scheme allowed for flexible options for 
most groups, and many people would not have to submit evidence at all because the 
government already holds data on them. However, there are some smaller groups of people 
who could face problems with evidence.  
 
Firstly, while the majority of people have bank accounts, there are those who do not. In fact, 
3.5% of adults do not have bank accounts, across all nationalities which is equivalent to 
approximately 90,000 European citizens. Secondly, many European citizens do not have proof 
of work or residence because they have informal arrangements that do not produce 
documentation. Some lack ID documentation. While the provision of identity documents is a 
key part of the required evidence for the scheme, the 2011 census found that up to 100k EU 
born residents had no passport.  
 
Pre-settled status/settled status 
There is a concern that some people who are eligible for settled status will receive pre-settled 
status instead, because they cannot or do not provide evidence of at least 5 years’ residence. 
This is problematic for several reasons. Pre-settled status does not secure permanent status, 
so people with pre-settled status will need to apply again for settled status later. If a person 
with pre-settled status has a child, that child is not automatically a British citizen (they would 
be automatically a citizen if the parent had settled status). In addition, other particularly 
vulnerable groups such as victims of exploitation, victims of abuse, those with mental health 
problems, Roma citizens, those with disabilities may have problems securing settled status 
and thus will be given a more precarious immigration status.  
 
Data outliers 
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Some EU citizens may not be considered vulnerable but may nonetheless fail to apply to the 
scheme at all. The size of this group is difficult to predict at the moment. However, it could 
include long term residents who feel that they should not need to apply for a status they have 
had for most of their lives; EU citizens planning to return to the UK post Brexit; those who are 
planning to return to their country of origin eventually  and do not feel that they  need to apply; 
people who do not think that things will change; the elderly; existing permanent residence 
holders; those who perceive themselves to ineligible due to previous rejections or criminality, 
for example.  
 
Sumption expects that the largest number of people at risk will be those who are not aware of 
the Scheme. The fate of these groups depends mostly on the approach that the Government 
chooses to take after the deadline. The government has said it will take a ‘proportionate 
approach’ to people who did not apply where there is a ‘good reason’. However, some people 
will not have a good reason. Furthermore, the question of how individuals who do not have 
the required evidence in addition to having missed the deadline will be treated is still unclear. 
However, Sumption does point out that if the numbers of people in this group are big enough, 
the Government may consider extending the deadline or making the scheme declaratory.   
 
Will we know how many? 
Unless data collection improves, it may not be possible to accurately measure how many 
people have failed to apply for settled status. This is because current data sources come with 
substantial margins of error, and we know that they exclude some people, such as residents 
in communal establishments such as hostels, and certain EU/non-EU dual citizens.  
If they number of EU citizens who fail to apply for settled status is very large, it will probably 
be clear from the data. If it is less than a few hundred thousand, it will be more challenging. 
There are some solutions to this problem if the government wants to develop the data to 
understand what share of people have obtained settled status. For example, Sumption notes 
that other options for data collection include linking Home Office records to HMRC and DWP 
statistics. 
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4) Privatisation, ‘mission creep’ and lack of Home Office legal conscientiousness 
in the Home Office application process 
Sheona York, Clinic Solicitor, Kent Law Clinic, University of Kent 
 
York is a clinic solicitor working for the Kent Law Clinic since September 2012. Her research 
focuses on issues arising from recent and current UK immigration policies such as the aim to 
reduce net migration, to discourage unlawful migrants through the ‘hostile environment,’ and 
to deport foreign criminals. 
 
Introduction 
York explained that the hostile environment is characterised by UK immigration policy and 
practice which has increasingly operated on an “illegal unless proved legal” basis. The legal 
underpinning of the Home Office’s culture of disbelief is that the burden of proof is entirely on 
the applicant. However, for EU nationals and their families, the EU Settlement Scheme 
represents a major political change in UK immigration control where the legal intention is to 
grant status, not to refuse and where there is a shared burden of proof. However, the 
remaining problem is that those individuals who are not successful with the EU Settlement 
Scheme will still be exposed to the still present hostile environment together with all other non-
EU Applicants. 
 
Main features of UK immigration control 
Firstly, since the Thatcher government came to power, the government has multiplied the 
circumstances in which people have to prove their immigration status, and has increasingly 
required that this be done by producing specified documents rather than permitting holistic, 
common sense-based decisions. Therefore, the burden of proof on an applicant (not just for 
their immigration status but for any other public or private good or service) has in practice to 
be satisfied to the legal standard of “beyond all reasonable doubt.” This applies not just to 
unlawfully-present migrants (the ostensible target) but to those lawfully present. Secondly, the 
outsourcing of immigration enforcement to other public bodies, private entities and private 
individuals has legally distanced migrants from decisions made about them. For example, the 
Home Office may inform an employer or landlord about someone’s status (maybe erroneously) 
without the migrant herself being a party to that process27 and thus having no remedy if a 
                                                
27 From April 2018 the Home Office has provided access to this ‘service’ for migrants themselves, but 
only if they already hold a biometric residence permit or EU settled status. For example, York’s client, 
granted indefinite leave to remain (ILR) in 2010 without receiving any papers, has since then had the 
right to work, in law, but has been treated as an unlawfully-present migrant since 2005. 
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mistake has been made.28 Thirdly, the imposition of stricter requirements and significantly 
higher application fees, the lengthening waiting time for applications and appeals, the 
prevalence of Home Office case working and record-keeping errors, lack of caseworker 
discretion and common sense, and the lack of legal aid, (as well as the UK Supreme Court’s 
definition of “precariousness”29) have combined with those other trends to prevent many 
unlawfully-present migrants from successfully making meritorious applications to remain (thus 
perpetuating illegality), and making it difficult for many lawful migrants to renew their leave, 
thus creating illegality.30 
 
For the over 3 million visa applications and 130,000 citizenship applications made every year 
to UK Visas and Immigration (therefore, all other applications other than the EU Settlement 
Scheme), the privatisation of visa application centres (from 2005) and the rapid move to online 
application forms for applications from within the UK (from mid-2018) have been carried out 
with no published “statement of intent”, no trialling and only imperfect post-hoc lines of 
communication from applicant groups to those in the Home Office designing the process.31 
This too has intensified the two processes of legal distancing and creating and perpetuating 
illegality. This is important for today’s discussion because once EU nationals and any non-EU 
family members cease to be protected by their separate Scheme they too will be subject to 
the hostile legal forms and content of UK immigration control.   
 
The EU Settlement Scheme – a major political change? 
The contrast with the treatment of EU nationals under the Settlement Scheme could not be 
clearer. At a practical level, uniquely in the history of migrants’ applications to the Home Office, 
the Settlement Scheme was subject to two separate trials for specific groups of EU nationals 
before being opened to all applicants, the results of which were formally considered and acted 
on. For EU nationals, the legal intention is to grant status, (effectively adopting a shared 
burden and lower standard of proof, even below the balance of probabilities) as well as 
explicitly renouncing some of the controversial requirements of the EEA Regulations;32 and 
the political intention, backed up by significant resources, is to ensure that no one gets left 
                                                
28 The Home Office is threatened with judicial review, but this cannot injunct the employer to employ 
the person or not dismiss them. 
29 Rhuppiah [2018] UKSC 58; Richard Warren “Private life in the balance: constructing the precarious 
migrant” (2016) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 124, 130. 
30 From York’s submissions to the Windrush Lessons Learned Review, drawing on her paper ‘The 
‘hostile environment’ - how Home Office immigration policies and practices create and perpetuate 
illegality’ (2018) 32(4) Journal of Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law 363. 
31 This lack of forward planning and lack of involvement of applicants’ stakeholders is completely 
standard – see part 4 of the paper.  
32 Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, in particular regarding the need for 
comprehensive sickness insurance and the treatment of gaps in enjoyment of Treaty rights. 
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behind, for fear of another Windrush debacle. This refers to the fact that since Windrush, staff 
resources and time have been provided for careful, cooperative decision-making; 
controversial requirements have been abandoned; and the experience of applicants has been 
sought and improvements made to the process. 
 
The EU Settlement Scheme – two telling cultural and political changes – (1) ‘looking to grant, 
not for reasons to refuse’, (2) a conscious effort to ensure no one who is eligible is left out of 
the EU scheme? 
The EU Settlement Scheme Statement of Intent, as quoted in the Independent Chief Inspector 
of Borders and Immigration report,33 stated that the Home Office wished to take the 
opportunity to develop a fresh culture in this new business area, one that reflected the aim of 
‘looking to grant, not for reasons to refuse.’ Both that inspection report and the recent Home 
Affairs Committee (HAC) report34 noted that part of the success of the first two trials of the 
new scheme, and of the functioning of the full scheme so far, must be due in large part to 
there being relatively good levels of staff resources, with high morale. ‘Everyone said that they 
were committed to providing a world class customer service’ and were clear that the aim was 
to ensure that the decision the applicant received was ‘right first time’.35 The Home Office 
clearly recognise that to achieve such a culture requires significant additional resources as 
well as a change in attitude. For example, for those applicants for whom the standard HMRC 
and DWP checks did not show five years’ residence, Home Office caseworkers were permitted 
(i.e. afforded the time) to exercise discretion in favour of the applicant and would not refuse 
an application for lack of documentation before attempting to contact the applicant to assist 
them find additional information.36 In relation to vulnerable applicants, again the Home Office 
recognised that these would need extra resources, and has agreed to provide funding ‘of up 
to £9m’ for voluntary organisations to assist such applicants.37 However, even the level of 
resources and planning so far provided has not resolved all issues, and the Home Office has 
been urged to make further funding available to assist with vulnerable groups, as well as 
paying for travel to document scanning locations, help with fees, etc. 
                                                
33 David Bolt, ‘An inspection of the EU Settlement Scheme November 2018-January 2019’ 
(Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI), May 2019) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7
99439/An_inspection_of_the_EU_Settlement_Scheme_May_WEB.PDF> accessed 3 September 
2019. 
34 Home Affairs Committee, ‘EU Settlement Scheme Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19’ (House of 
Commons, 14 May 2019) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhaff/1945/1945.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2019, 17. 
35 Bolt (n32) para 6.13. 
36 Bolt (n32) para 6.39, 6.45-48. 
37 Bolt (n32) para 6.51. 
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But underlying all this trialling, concern and preparation is a clear political aim to ensure that 
all eligible EU nationals and their family members do make a successful application under the 
scheme, so as not to be left without status – explicitly attempting to avoid a new Windrush 
scandal. In other words, the Home Office appears to be adopting a shared responsibility for 
the stability and security of status of EU nationals and their families, into the future. 
 
However, as York points out, the key remaining issue (and why it is so troubling that the Home 
Secretary, in his responses to the HAC,38 did not seem truly to appreciate the difficulties 
caused by the hostile environment) is that many both lawful and unlawful individuals within the 
UK will still be exposed to the hostile environment, including those who are unsuccessful with 
the scheme: this has not been addressed. In other words, the government’s approach to the 
EU Settlement Scheme is completely different to the various currently existing regimes 
governing applications for entry visas and or leave to remain. The high-level position of the 
Home Office towards non-EU migrants is that while they might choose to enter or remain in 
the UK their motives are always suspect and must accept that their presence in the UK is 
fundamentally temporary and must be strictly policed.  
 
What are the effects of UK immigration control on those lawfully present? 
A recent ICIBI inspection into Home Office approach to illegal working refers to a Home Office 
2014 estimate that 500,000 people might be in the UK lawfully but do not have a biometric 
residence permit (obligatory for non-EU and non-UK citizens since 2008), of whom only 90,000 
have since applied for one.  This means that the remaining lawful residents who do not have 
this residence permit are all subject to the ‘hostile environment.’ Further, the barriers to 
asserting their legal rights have increased because of privatisation and Home Office ‘mission 
creep’ in the application process. 
 
What are the effects of the presence of UK immigration control for illegal migrants? 
The Home Office does not know how many illegal migrants there are in the UK. The most 
recent estimates are from 2009, of between 450,000 and 900,000. These are the ostensible 
targets of the hostile environment. These may technically be failed asylum-seekers, illegal 
entrants, overstayers, those with leave curtailed or revoked, or who have had a deportation 
order made, but who have not left. Many of these have arguable rights and entitlements under 
the Immigration Rules, case law or Home Office policies, but for whom the barriers to making 
arguable applications have increased because of privatisation and Home Office ‘mission 
                                                
38 Home Affairs Committee (n33) 17. 
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creep.’  
 
Privatisation and ‘legal distancing’ 
York notes many charities and non-governmental organisations have all pointed out how 
technological issues (such as crashes and browser compatibility issues) and misinformation 
about where to send evidence distances the applicant from the legal rules.  In addition to this 
there is no route of redress, which further perpetuates legal distancing. As York points out, 
from the moment of submission via Sopra Steria (a French private company) until the Home 
Office refusal, there is no Home Office contact point or formal way of intervening.39  Thus, an 
application may be refused, or rejected, or even not successfully made, on the basis of 
decisions made by the outsourced entity. Applicants do not have access to their algorithms or 
other Sopra Steria case-working procedures, and thus, even if a judicial review of the Home 
Office is theoretically available, they cannot obtain the necessary information. In her 
concluding statements, York points out the malign transformation of ‘applicants’ into 
‘customers’ in the minds and public vocabulary of governments and managers of public 
bodies. However, regardless of whether any particular migrant has a ‘choice’ whether or not 
to come to or remain in the UK, in relation to the application process they have no choice. This 
is why Amber Rudd’s comment about setting up an LK Bennett account40 was so wide of the 
mark. If LK Bennett’s online shopping portal was as bad as the Home Office, no one would 
shop there, whereas a person applying for a public right or entitlement must apply to the Home 
Office – and is in no way a “customer” but always and only an applicant. Finally, under public 
administrative law, an applicant must have access to the law, and to a fair and transparent 
procedure. 
 
Concluding remarks 
During the period of the Legacy,41 hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers waited years for 
decisions, and, in despair, shopped around from one lawyer to another in the hope of finding 
someone who could resolve their case. Precisely because of the capricious nature of the 
process, the difference between good and bad advisers began to blur. There is a danger that 
                                                
39 The new online system was launched rapidly in November 2018 along with a £91 million contract to 
a French company, Sopra Steria, to run a number of locations where applicants would, by 
appointment, attend to enrol their biometrics and bring their supporting documents to be scanned. 
40 ‘Rudd says online EU registration will be 'as easy as shopping at LK Bennett'’ (The Guardian, 23 
April 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/apr/23/amber-rudd-online-eu-registration-
system-lk-bennett> accessed 3 September 2019. 
41 Following the 2006 discovery of 450,000 unresolved asylum applications, the Case Resolution 
Directorate was set up to deal with all of them by July 2011. Cases were drawn out of the archive at 
random and ‘worked on to a conclusion’, with no way of prioritising urgent cases, or, e.g. dealing with 
all those from a specific country after a new country guidance case. Solicitors spent years telling 
clients ‘there was nothing we can do’ to resolve their cases.  
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the essentially capricious nature of application procedures both from outside the UK and inside 
will have a similar effect. The opaque process is leaving solicitors and advisers ignorant of the 
procedures and any new ‘requirements’, so clients cannot be advised confidently, leading 
applicants to shop around, pay stupid money, make unmeritorious application, and fall into or 
remain in the hostile environment. If these problems are not solved for all immigration 
applications, eventually EU nationals and family members may face the same issues in 
future.42   
                                                
42 See also Jonathan Thomas, ‘Back to the future – what history tells us about the challenges of post-
Brexit UK immigration policy’ (Social Market Foundation, May 2019).  
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Concluding remarks 
 
It is important to emphasise that this conference, held on 11 June 2019, set out the state-of-
play of immigration in the UK (primarily for EU citizens, but also concerning UK citizens in the 
EU and other non-EU individuals) at the time. It intended broadly to be a brief and early 
evaluation of the progress of the EU Settlement Scheme two and a half months on from its 
official roll-out to the public after 29 March 2019. It is relevant to note that this was also the 
original date of withdrawal for the UK from the EU, whose subsequent extension did not affect 
the EU Settlement Scheme’s operation.  
 
The intention of the conference and its different parts were to consider views from a broad 
spectrum of interested and influential parties. It is important to note at this juncture that 
arguably the most interested and influential party, the UK Home Office, accepted the invitation 
to participate in the conference but did not consent to being part of the conference proceedings 
outlined above in this report. Their presentation was entitled ‘EU Settlement Scheme – 
protecting the rights of European citizens in the UK’. However, the rest of the conference report 
is a reflection of views from policy and practice in Part A, from representatives of individuals 
participant to the Scheme in Part B and from academia in Part C. 
 
The conference discussed several areas where immigration policy concerning immigration 
post-Brexit needed some further reflection. As such, it was the intention of the conference and 
this report to bring awareness and attention to these very important issues. In particular, there 
was a focus on certain parties that were at a disproportionate disadvantage in applying 
successfully for settlement (Erdunast, Desira) this due to the policies in place concerning how 
the UK intended to govern these individuals (set out by Wilkins at the beginning in her overview 
of UK government’s (then) position on immigration). In particular, the idea was to raise 
awareness of both the individuals who by their nature could arguably be said to be vulnerable 
such as the poorer and less educated Roma and Eastern European communities 
(Zagrodniczek, Bica), and less obvious scenarios such as certain groups of abused women 
(Masri). Focus in particular was on why and how individuals may be disadvantaged in a more 
legal sense (Persey, Sumption, Yong) and how these issues were translated to experience of 
British expatriates living abroad in the EU (Benson). 
 
It is difficult to come to any concrete conclusions at a time of such flux, change and 
unprecedentedness in the political environment surrounding the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. 
However, it is hoped that this conference report sheds some much needed light on the crucial 
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issues facing individual rights protection in light of immigration and Brexit. As the UK 
government wades it way through the murky waters of Brexit, the hope is that some of the 
issues highlighted and addressed at this conference will be addressed in due course. There 
are serious legal and practical implications of the issues highlighted, and it would be prudent 
legally and practically for the concerns raised to be dealt with, and hopefully resolved before 
there are serious implications on individuals’ lives. After all, what is at stake here could have 
a profound effect on millions of individuals livelihoods, private lives and family lives, and if 
there is one thing bringing together all the conference participants contributions is that the 
individual is at the centre of each consideration, and there are some reasons why this must 
be the case in light of Brexit.   
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